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NOTES AND COMMENTS
RECENT CHANGES IN THE ILLINOIS FORCIBLE ENTRY AND
DETAINER ACT REGARDING CONDOMINIUM PROPERTY
On December 8, 1971, the Illinois General Assembly approved two
bills which became effective July 1, 1972. These bills, Senate Bill 645
(Public Act 77-1759) and Senate Bill 646 (Public Act 77-1760), amend
2
the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act,' and the Condominium Property Act,
giving the condominium property owners' association or board of managers
a new remedy under the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act. 3 These acts
provide a unique remedy to be used against the condominium property
owner which initially must be interpreted in light of Illinois landlord/tenant
and contract buyers case law.
NEW PROVISIONS OF THE FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER ACT

Section 2 of the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act, which deals with
when the forcible entry and detainer action may be maintained, has had a
new subsection added which provides:
Seventh, When any property is subject to the provisions of the
"Condominium Property Act", approved June 20, 1963, as
amended, and the board of managers of such property is entitled
to possession of a unit therein by reason of the failure or refusal
of the owner of such unit to pay when due his proportionate share
of the expenses of administration, maintenance and repair of the
common elements of such property, or of any other expenses lawfully agreed upon, and such unit owner withholds possession of
his unit after demand in writing setting
4 forth the amount claimed
by the board of managers, or its agents.
1. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 57 (1971)

[hereinafter referred to as the "Act"].

2. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 30, § 301 et seq. (1971)
"Condominium Act"].

[hereinafter referred to as the

3. A third bill, which amended the Homestead Exemption Act, 111. Rev. Stat.
ch. 52 (1971), was passed in conjunction with Senate Bills 645 and 646. The amendment is not discussed in this article but should be noted by the practitioner as relevant
with respect to condominium property.

Senate Bill 644 (Public Act 77-1758) amended the Homestead Exemption Act,
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 52, § 3 (1971), so that section 3 of the act, as of July 1, 1972, now

reads:

No property shall, by virtue of this Act, be exempt from sale for non-

payment of taxes or assessments, or for a debt or liability incurred for the
purchase or improvement thereof, or for enforcement of a lien thereon for
nonpayment of common expenses pursuant to the "Condominium Property
Act", approved June 20, 1963, as now or hereafter amended.
4. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 57, § 2 (1972).
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The newly enacted provision entitles the board of managers to a remedy under the Act whenever the condominium unit owner fails to pay his
proportionate share of the expenses of administration, maintenance and repair of the common elements of the condominiupi, or any other expenses
lawfully agreed upon. This clause seemingly implies that a remedy under

the Act now exists in favor of the board of managers for breach of certain
contractual obligations which may arise between the condominium property
owner and the board of managers that do not involve contracts to purchase
and contract buyers. Contracts to purchase and contract buyers are specifically dealt with in other sections of the Act.5

The last part of subsection seven deals with the demand for possession
by the board of managers. The demand for possession from a condominium
property owner provides that the board of managers must demand both possession and the amount of money claimed. This is the only instance in the
Act where the demand must include the amount of money claimed by the
plaintiff.6
The most significant new section of the Act, 13.1, that applies to con-

dominium property, provides:
As to property subject to the provisions of the "Condominium

Property Act", approved June 30, 1963, as amended when the action is based upon the failure of an owner of a unit therein to pay
when due his proportionateshare of the expenses of administration,
maintenance and repair of the common elements, or of any other
expenses lawfully agreed upon, and if the court finds that such expenses are due to the plaintiff, the plaintiff shall be entitled to the

5. See Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 57, § 2 (fifth), § 13 (1971), both dealing specifically
with defaulting contract purchasers.
6. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 57, § 3 (1972) now provides:
The demand required by Section 2 may be made by delivering a copy
thereof to the tenant, or by leaving such a copy with some person above the
age of 12 years, residing on, or being in charge of, the premises; or in case no
one is in actual possession of the premises, then by posting the same on the
premises, provided, that in case there is a contract for the purchase of such
lands or tenements, or in case the property is subject to the provisions of the
"Condominium Property Act", approved June 20, 1963, as amended, notice
that a proceeding under the provisions of this Act is to be instituted shall be
given to the purchaser under such contract, or to the unit owner, as the case
may be, at least 30 days prior to the institution of such proceeding, either by
notifying such purchaser or unit owner personally of such fact or by sending notice thereof by registered or certified mail to the last known address of
such purchaser or unit owner. When any such demand is made by an officer
authorized to serve process, his return shall be prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated, and if such demand is made by any person not an
officer, the return may be sworn to by the person serving the same, and shall
then be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Which demand for
possession may be in the following form:

To ..

.....

I hereby demand immediate possession of the following described premises: (describing the same.)
Which demand shall be signed by the person claiming such possession,
his agent, or attorney. Where the property is subject to the provisions of the
"Condominium Property Act", approved June 20, 1963, as amended, the demand for possession shall set forth the amount claimed.
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possession of the whole of the premises claimed, and he shall have
judgment for the possession thereof and for the amount found due
by the court together with reasonable attorney's fees, if any, and
for his costs; the court, by order, shall stay the issuance of the writ
of restitution for a period of not less than 60 days from the date
of the judgment and may stay the issuance of the writ for a period
of not to exceed 180 days from such date. If at any time either
during or after such period of stay defendant pays such expenses
found due by the court, plus costs and reasonable attorney's fees
as fixed by the court, defendant may file a motion to vacate the
judgment in the court in which the judgment was entered, and, if
the court, upon the hearing of such motion, is satisfied that such
default in payment of his proportionate share of expenses has been
cured, such judgment shall be vacated. Unless defendant files
such motion to vacate in such court or files an action seeking to effect or restrain the enforcement of such judgment within said period of stay, execution shall issue immediately upon expiration of
such period of stay and all rights of the defendant to possession of
his unit shall cease and determine until the date that such judgment
may thereafter be vacated in accordance with the foregoing provisions. Nothing therein contained shall be construed as affecting
the right of the board of managers, or its agents, to any lawful
remedy or relief other than provided by this Act.7
An analysis of the new section 13.1 reveals that if the court determines
that the specified common element expenses or other expenses lawfully
agreed upon are due and owing to the plaintiff, the plaintiff shall have judgment for possession of the whole premises claimed and for the amount of
money found due, plus attorney's fees and court costs. It is at this point
that the drafters could have elaborated further. The question arises as to
what exactly are the rights of the board of managers once they have become
entitled to possession. Conceivably the board would be free to lease the
unit and apply the rent received to the debt of the recalcitrant condominium
unit owner. This theory appears to be impractical in application since
the unit owner may vacate the judgment by curing his default of payment, thus regaining his right to possess the unit. This writer feels that
it would be unwise for the board, once entitled to possession, to lease or
otherwise cause the unit to become occupied because the unit owner may regain his right to possession.
The last sentence of section 13.1 provides that the plaintiff is not foreclosed from using any other lawful remedy or means of relief, including the
remedies of suit for breach of contract, and lien.8
NEW PROVISIONS OF THE CONDOMINIUM PROPERTY ACT
An entirely new section has been added to the Condominium Act which
7. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 57, § 13.1 (1972) (emphasis added).
8. See 111.Rev. Stat. ch. 30, § 309 (1971). Sharing expenses-Lien for nonpayment.
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incorporates the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act Amendments. Section
309.2 entitled "Other Remedies", provides:
In the event of any default by any unit owner in the performance
of his obligations under this Act or under the declaration, bylaws,
or the rules and regulations of the board of managers, the board of
managers or its agents shall have such rights and remedies additional to those provided by this Act as shall be provided in the declaration or by-laws, or as shall otherwise be provided or permitted by
law. If such remedies shall include the right to take possession of

such unit owner's interest in the property, the board of managers
or its agents may maintain for the benefit of all the other unit
owners an action for possession in the manner prescribed by "An
Act in regard to forcible entry and detainer", approved February
16, 1874, as amended. 9
It should be emphasized that this new remedy under the Act and the
Condominium Act is now available to the board of managers for any default
by the condominium unit owner of an obligation that accrues under the Condominium Act, the declaration,' 0 bylaws," or rules and regulations of the
board of managers. The new remedy appears to be elective in nature because

of the wording of section 309.2. It appears that in order for the forcible entry
and detainer remedy to apply, the declaration or bylaws must make mention of this new remedy. 12
As of this writing, a search of other leading condominium property acts
has not revealed the existence of any provision which allows the board of
9. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 30, § 309.2 (1972) (emphasis added).
10. The declaration is the registered or recorded instrument whereby the condominium developer places the property under the provisions of the Condominium
Property Act. The condominium unit purchaser thus purchases his property subject to
the recorded declaration and is bound by its provisions. The declaration may be
deemed a covenant running with the land which binds the unit purchaser to the provisions of the recorded declaration. See Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 30, § 302, 303, 304, 306
(1971); Chicago Bar Association, Model Declaration of Condominium Ownership
(1967); Kane and Helms, The Illinois Condominium Property Act, 1970 L.F. 159,
163-168; 1 A. Ferrer and K. Stecher, Law of Condominiums, §§ 301, 302, 351
(1963).
11. The by-laws are the rules which govern the administration of the condominium. They generally provide, among other things, for the maintenance of common
elements, voting procedures, assessment procedures, and general rules and regulations
governing the conduct of the unit owners. The Condominium Property Act requires
that a copy of the by-laws be appended to and recorded with the declaration. Thus the
condominium unit purchaser takes his unit subject to the recorded by-laws and recorded declaration. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 30, §§ 317, 318 (1971); Chicago Bar Association, Exhibit "C" to Model Declaration of Condominium Ownership By-Laws (1967);
1 A. Ferrer and K. Stecher, Law of Condominiums, §§ 301, 302, 351 (1963).
12. On July 1, 1972, there were three other changes that took effect pertaining
to the Condominium Property Act. These amendments and new sections do not deal
with the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act and are not within the scope of this article.
See Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 30, § 310 (1972) dealing with separate taxation, Ill. Rev.
Stat. ch. 30, § 312 (1972) dealing with insurance proceeds, and Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 30,
§ 18.2 (1972) dealing with administration of condominium property prior to election
of initial board of managers.
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managers a similar remedy for non-payment such as the Forcible Entry and
Detainer Act.1 3
ADVANTAGES OF THE RECENT ILLINOIS ENACTMENTS

The advantage of giving the board of managers a new remedy under the
Forcible Entry and Detainer Act, read in conjunction with the Condominium
Property Act, is that the board of managers now has a powerful and speedy
remedy by which to compel the recalcitrant condominium unit owner to make
his required payments. Prior to enactment of the present legislation, the
Condominium Property Act provided that the remedy to be used by the
board of managers was that of a priority lien which could be foreclosed as a
mortgage upon real property. 14 In terms of speed, convenience, and legal
expense a summary proceeding under the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act
is to be preferred to the lien and foreclosure method of enforcement.
The newly amended Forcible Entry and Detainer Act will probably
serve to coerce condominium unit owners into the prompt payment of an
obligation due and owing to the board of managers. The threat of an immediate loss of the unit owner's right to possession appears to be a very serious
threat that would, in all probability, be heeded by a reasonable owner.
A final advantage of the new legislation is that it may encourage condominium sales by giving prospective condominium purchasers a relative
sense of security, viz; with the new legislation they can be virtually assured
that the obligations of condominium ownership will be shared proportionately by all of the unit owners.
DISADVANTAGES OF THE RECENT ILLINOIS ENACTMENTS

The major disadvantage of the new legislation is that the condominium
unit owner may be relegated to the status of a rent paying tenant. If the
unit owner does not pay his obligations, which are somewhat akin to rent,
he may lose his right of possession.
13.
Arizona:
California:
Florida:
Maryland:
Massachusetts:
Michigan:
New Jersey:
New York:

A.R.S. § 33-551 et seq. (Supp. 1971)
West's Ann. Civ. Code § 1350 et seq. (Supp. 1972)
F.S.A. § 711.01 et seq. (Supp. 1972)
Ann. Code of Md. Art. 21, § 117A et seq. (Supp. 1970)
M.G.L.A. ch. 183A, § 6 et seq. (Supp. 1972)
M.C.L.A. § 559.19 et seq. (Supp. 1971)
N.J.S.A. ch. 168, § 46:8A et seq. (Supp. 1972)
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated,
New York Real Property Law § 339d et seq. (McKinney
Supp. 1971)
Ohio:
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5311.01 et seq. (Supp. 1971)
Pennsylvania:
18 P.S. § 4403 et seq. (Supp. 1971)
R.C.W.A. § 64.32.090 et seq. (1971)
Washington:
14. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 30, § 309 (1971) Sharing of expenses-Lien for non-

payment.
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Just as the legislation may serve as an inducement to purchase a condominium unit, the reverse may also be true. Prospective purchasers may
refrain from purchase when they realize that in reality they may be little
more than rent paying tenants.
PROBABLE EFFECT AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION

Owing to the fact that Illinois has never had a Forcible Entry and Detainer Act pertaining to fee simple ownership of condominiums, interpretations are likely to come from Illinois landlord and tenant law arising under
the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act.
Historically, an action under the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act has
been a summary proceeding to determine the right of possession. In Meier
v. Hilton;"5 the Illinois Supreme Court emphasized the summary nature of
the proceeding when the court stated:
The action of forcible entry and detainer is a summary statutory
proceeding for restoring to the possession of land one who is
wrongfully kept out or has been wrongfully deprived of the possession, in the particular cases mentioned in the statute. It is a
possessory action only, and it usually arises where one's possession
has been forcibly invaded between landlord and lessee, vendor
and vendee, or the purchaser at a judicial sale and a party to the
judicial proceeding. The question of title cannot be tried but
only the right of possession. 16
In Meier the court held that a defendant in a forcible entry action
could not raise the legal defense of better title. Thirty years earlier in St.
Louis Stock Yards v. Wiggins Ferry Co. 17 the court refused to allow defendant to avail himself of the equitable defense of estoppel in pals by
stating:
An action of forcible detainer being, as we have just seen, in
the strictest sense a proceeding at law, and an estoppel in pais
affecting real estate being an equitable right, cognizable only in a
court of equity, it follows that the circuit court, conceding the
existence of the estoppel claimed, properly refused to allow it
as a defense to the present action.'
These basic rules of Meier and St. Louis Stock Yards were rather
strictly followed for many years and were summarized in Wein v. Albany
Park Motor Sales Co. 19 where the court, after citing Meier and St. Louis
Stock Yards, said:
15. 257 Ill. 174, 100 N.E.520 (1912).
16. Id. at 179, 100 N.E. at 521.
17. 102 111. 514 (1882).
18. Id. at 521, see also Jones v. Jones, 181 Ill. 595, 600, 117 N.E. 1013, 1015
(1917), where the court said:
The equitable right of the appellant to have the deed set aside could not be
tried in a forcible entry and detainer suit.
19. 312 Ill. App. 353, 38 N.E.2d 556 (1941).
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Since the only purpose of the evidence outlined in defendant's
offer of proof was to attack plaintiff's title and to attempt to contradict the recitals in the instruments of title through which plaina right of possession, said offer of proof was properly
tiff claims
20
rejected.
The court's refusal to allow legal or equitable defenses has been liberalized in recent years. In Melburg v. Dakin21, the defendant was a tenant
farmer who had planted his spring crops in reliance upon plaintiff's misrepresentations. The court, in reversing for the tenant, allowed him to interpose
both legal and equitable defenses to plaintiff's forcible entry and detainer
action. The court stated:
Although there is authority to the contrary, under some statutes,
the defenses interposed may be equitable as well as legal and there
is authority to the effect that all defenses, both legal and equitable,
may be made, under a plea of not guilty in a forcible entry and detainer proceeding. 2
At this point it should be noted that the Forcible Entry and Detainer
Act specifically provides:
The defendant may under a general denial of the allegations of
the complaint give in evidence any matter in defense of the action. No matters not germane to the distinctive purpose of the
proceeding
shall be introduced by joinder, counterclaim, or other23
wise.

While the courts have been somewhat reluctant to give this clause anything
but the strictest interpretation there have been several exceptions. As previously noted in Melburg the court will allow equitable or legal defenses to
the action where the conduct of one of the parties shocks the conscience of
the court.
In Allenworth v. First Galesburg National Bank and Trust Co.,24 plaintiff had lost title to certain property eleven years prior to the present action
and had for the past eleven years continually vexed defendant thru a variety
of legal actions and proceedings. In the present forcible entry and detainer
action defendants counterclaimed for an injunction to restrain plaintiff's
harassment. The court, in upholding the counterclaim as germane, stated:
It is, therefore, clear that the actions and notices brought or filed
by plaintiff constitute clouds on the title of Galesburg Glass Company, the owner thereof, and that equity has jurisdiction to quiet
the title, remove said clouds, and enjoin the further prosecution
of any actions by plaintiff. It is also quite clear that equity has
jurisdiction to enjoin the prosecution of a forcible entry and detainer
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 359, 38 N.E.2d at 560.

337 Ill. App. 204, 85 N.E.2d 482 (1949).
Id. at 211, 85 N.E.2d at 485.
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 57, § 5 (1971).
24. 7 Il1. App. 2d 1, 128 N.E.2d 600 (1955).
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suit even though the defendant may have an adequate remedy at
law by
reason of a defense to the forcible entry and detainer ac25
tion.
The "germane" defenses of Melburg and Allensworth were distinguished in Bleck v. Cosgrove.2 6 The court in upholding plaintiff's verdict
conceded that certain defenses do exist. The court, however, implied that
these defenses were limited to the more extreme situations, as presented in
27
Melburg and A llensworth.
The issue of what defense to allow and when such defense is "germane"
in a forcible entry and detainer proceeding was greatly clarified in Rosewood
Corporation v. Fisher.28 Rosewood involved a consolidation of 156 suits
pertaining to certain Negro families who had purchased homes from plaintiff
corporation under a land contract purchase plan. The defendants became
dissatisfied with the terms of their land purchase contracts and sought to
correct their problems through self-help. When defendants defaulted in
their payment, plaintiff proceeded under the Forcible Entry and Detainer
Act. Defendants answered by claiming as a defense that they had been discriminated against and that plaintiff had taken unfair advantage. In reversing the lower court and holding for the defendant contract purchasers the
Illinois Supreme Court stated:
Limiting ourselves to a consideration of the act only so far as
it applies to contract purchasers of land, this case is, so far as we
can ascertain, one of first impression in this court. It is our opinion that the defenses going to the validity and enforcibility of the
contracts relied upon by the plaintiffs were germane to the distinctive purpose of the forcible entry and detainer actions and
were improperly stricken. That purpose, to repeat, is to restore
possession to one who is entitled to the right of possession. "Germane" has been judicially defined as meaning "closely allied,"
and is further defined in Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary, p. 767, as meaning: "closely related; closely connected;
relevant; pertinent; appropriate." Whereas here, the right to possession a plaintiff seeks to assert has its source in an installment
contract for the purchase of real estate by the defendant, we believe it must necessarily follow that matters which go to the validity
and enforcibility of that contract are germane, or relevant to a determination of the right to possession. This is particularly true for
two reasons. First, because a contract buyer becomes the equitable owner of the property upon execution of an installment contract, (citing cases) and thus by such an action may be stripped of
his equitable ownership as well as possession; second, the contract
purchaser is faced not only with the loss of possession, but, unlike
a tenant, trespasser or a squatter, is likewise faced with the loss of
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 4, 128 N.E.2d at 601.
32 Ill. App. 2d 267, 177 N.E.2d 647 (1961).
Id. at 272, 177 N.E.2d at 649.
46 Ill. 2d 249, 263 N.E.2d 833 (1970).
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the equity accumulated by payments made on the contract. Here,
for example, the Fishers had paid approximately $10,000 towards
satisfaction of their total contract obligations. On the other side of
the coin, a contract seller claiming and seeking to enforce a claimed
right of possession should not be permitted to prevail on the basis of
such contract so long as its validity and enforceability is questionable under the law. Should a contract purchaser not be permitted
to defend upon the very contract upon which the seller relies, in
our judgment the result could be, as argued, a direct denial of constitutional rights and an indirect denial of civil rights. We believe that contract buyers may plead equitable defenses and be
given equitable relief if it is established that the contracts 29are unconscionable or in violation of civil rights as here contended.
The court then continued to state what effect its decision would have upon
the summary aspects of the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act:
It does not escape us that the construction we have placed
upon the act may interfere with the summary aspects of the remedy, when it is invoked against contract purchasers. But the
right of such purchasers to be heard on relevant matters, and to
be secure in their constitutional rights, as well as the desirable
purpose of preventing a multiplicity of suits, is, and must be,
80 superior to the desire to provide a speedy remedy for possession.
The "germane" defenses of Rosewood were almost immediately expanded upon one year later in Marine Park Associates v. Johnson.31 Al-

though the Illinois Supreme Court in Rosewood limited itself strictly to contract purchasers, the Illinois Appellate Court in Marine Park Associates upheld defendant's defense to a forcible entry and detainer action that was
based upon an alleged violation of defendant's civil and constitutional rights.
The defense was based on the theory that defendant had been denied a
lease renewal by plaintiff because defendant was a Negro. The court in applying Rosewood, which dealt strictly with contract purchasers, expanded the
scope of the Rosewood "germane" defenses and applied these defenses to an
action involving a lessor and lessee. In Marine Park Associates the court
asked:
Is the assertion of a claim under 42 U.S.C., sec. 3604(a) and
sec. 1982, germane to the distinctive purpose of determining plaintiff's right to possession? The answer, we think, is that whether
possession is sought by reason of lease termination or refusal to renew, if based upon the rights enunciated and protected by these
sections, then such is pertinent and germane under Rosewood to the
distinctive purpose of the proceeding and can be introduced by
"joinder, counterclaim or otherwise". Paraphrasing Rosewood,
defendant should not be forced to initiate a separate proceeding
where the same relief might be forthcoming in the present one.
29. Id. at 256-257, 263 N.E.2d at 838.
30. Id. at 258, 263 N.E.2d at 839.
31. 1111. App. 3d 460, 274 N.E.2d 645 (1971).
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We believe, as the court did in Rosewood, with regard to contract
buyers, that a lessee may plead equitable defenses and be given
equitable relief if it is established that the termination or the failure
to renew are in violation of her civil rights as contended. The language of 42 U.S.C., sec. 3604(a) is, shall we say, germane, at this
juncture: "It shall be unlawful-(a) to refuse to sell or rent after
making a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or
rental of, or otherwise make available or deny, a dwelling to any
person because of race, color, religion, or national origin." Defendant's claim is based on this section-refusal to renew or3 2the
termination itself-and if true, such presents an equitable defense.
The Illinois trend of allowing defendant to interpose certain defenses
was further expanded in Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little.3 3 Spring alleged that
two months back rent was due and owing, and thus, plaintiff was entitled
to possession. The only claim by plaintiff was for possession. No claim
for rent was argued before the Illinois Supreme Court. Defendant appealed
when plaintiff's motion to strike defendant's answer was granted:
She alleged the existence of an "oral lease"; plaintiff Jack Spring
Inc.'s promises, and the breach thereof, to make certain repairs;
many structural defects which are in violation of enumerated sections of the Municipal Code of Chicago; plaintiff's wilful neglect
and intentional refusal to repair them, and that plaintiff, by reason
of said refusal, was "in violation of an implied covenant of habitability

. .. 34

The court summarized:
Defendants contend the trial court erred in striking their affirmative defenses, thus refusing to permit them to raise the plaintiff's prior breach of their obligation to maintain the premises as
a condition to their right to possession. They argue that the obligation to pay "full rent" under a lease is interdependent with the
landlord's obligation to maintain and repair the premises, that
summary eviction in face of the landlord's failure to maintain the
premises is contrary to principles of equity, and that summary eviction based upon an "unconscionable lease" is vi6lative of defendants' constitutional rights. Plaintiffs contended the only issue
in a forcible detainer action is the right
to possession, and no equit35
able defenses can be recognized.
32. Id. at 468, 274 N.E.2d at 648; contra Peoria Housing Authority v. Sanders,
2 Ill. App. 3d 610, 276 N.E.2d 496 (1971) which was decided after Marine Park Associates. In Peoria Housing Authority v. Sanders the court refused to app* the Rose-

wood test to lessees and stated at 615, 276 N.E.2d at 500:
It appears clear that the Rosewood Corp. case has not scuttled the
prompt remedy provided in the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act but on the
contrary again the counterclaims must show a defense which is germane to
the question of the right to possession. It is also apparent that our Supreme
Court has differentiated between cases involving lessees, renters, andothose

involving purchasers.
33. 50 IIl. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972).
34. Id. at 353, 280 N.E.2d at 210; see generally Jaeger, The Warranty of Habitability Part 11, 47 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 1, 53-77 (1971).
35. 50 Ill.
2d 351, 357, 280 N.E.2d 208, 212 (1972).
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In reversing for the defendants the court said:
It is apparent, therefore, that even though the plaintiffs do not seek
to recover rent in these actions, the question of whether rent is
due and owing is not only germane, but in these cases where the
right to possession is asserted solely by reason 3of nonpayment, it is
the crucial and decisive issue for determination. 11
Summarizing the newly expanded "germane" defenses which are now
available to tenant defendants in a forcible entry and detainer action the
court concluded:
Insofar as defendants' affirmative defenses alleged the breach of
express covenants to repair, they were germane to the issue of
whether the defendants were indebted to plaintiffs for rent and we
find no impediment in our earlier opinions to the determination
of the issue in one rather than multiple actions. We hold, therefore, that
the trial court erred in striking these affirmative de37
fenses.
CONCLUSION

At first impression the recent amendments to the Condominium Property
Act and Forcible Entry and Detainer Act appear to be very favorable to the
board of managers in that the condominium unit owner may be deprived of
the right of possession if he fails to pay his assessments or other legal
charges. However, the recent amendments must be construed in light of
Rosewood Corporation v. Fisher,38 Marine Park Associates v. Johnson,39
and Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little.40 These three cases have greatly diminished
or entirely eliminated the summary aspect of the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act. The legal and equitable defenses which were permitted can
perhaps be used by a condominium unit owner holding fee simple title.
The new Forcible Entry and Detainer amendment itself strongly implies that certain defenses may be raised by the defendant owner when the
statute states that the plaintiff will be entitled to a judgment for possession
.and for the amount found due by the court ... ,1
It has been shown that both the condominium unit owner and the
board of managers have certain rights, duties and obligations which arise out
of the declaration, bylaws, and Condominium Property Act. The board of
managers has certain remedies which may be employed against the condominium unit owner. The recent amendments were no doubt enacted to
provide the board of managers with the so called "summary" remedy of the
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 358, 280 N.E.2d at 213.
Id.
46 Ill.
2d 249, 263 N.E.2d 833 (1970).
1 I11.
App. 3d 460, 274 N.E.2d 645 (1971).
50 Ill.
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NOTES AND COMMENTS

Forcible Entry and Detainer Act; but this remedy no longer appears to be
the "summary" proceeding it once was.
What then are some of the possible defenses that may be accepted by
the Illinois courts? An analysis of the more recent Illinois forcible entry and
detainer cases shows that the defendant, condominium unit owner, could
successfully interpose a "germane" defense to a forcible entry and detainer
proceeding if the board of managers had:
1. Failed to comply with the provisions of the declaration, bylaws,
or Condominium Property Act;
2. Defrauded the condominum unit owner;
3. Racially discriminated against the proposed lessee of the owner;
4. Taken unfair advantage of the owner;
5. Maintained the common elements in substantial violation of a
municipal building code.
The board of managers has a swift remedy which in the absence of the
above defenses, may be used to coerce or evict a truly recalcitrant unit
owner. The condominium unit owner having a valid and "germane" defense will have an opportunity to present this defense.
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